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Explaining the two-dimensional semantics role in the Zombie conceivability argument

yasser delfani; Ahmadreza Hemmatimoghaddam

Volume 9, Issue 18 , February 2020, , Pages 49-68

https://doi.org/10.30465/ps.2020.4626

Abstract
  Physicalism is a view that holds everything is physical and considers phenomenal consciousness as a physical phenomenon. The Zombie conceivability argument that has been raised by David Chalmers shows that phenomenal consciousness cannot be a physical phenomenon. As a result, the claim of physicalism ...  Read More